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Available online xxxxInformation and communications technology (ICT)/cyber technologies become ever-more embedded in our
economies and societies, bringing both beneﬁts and risk-related costs. The balance between those beneﬁts and
costs, over time and across countries, remains poorly understood. This gives rise to conﬂicting narratives about
the future of ICT: either (1) continued rapid beneﬁt growth with newwaves of ICT technology; or (2) increasing
cyber-attack costs will come to swamp beneﬁts.
We explore how the balance between beneﬁts and costs might change at the global, country-grouping, and
country-level out to 2030. Because the existing literature provides little foundation for integrated analysis, we
did extensive conceptual research and data gathering from diverse sources. The beneﬁts include the growth of
the ICT sector itself, its contribution to broader productivity as a general purpose technology, and its beneﬁts
for consumers as value for price rises very signiﬁcantly. The costs include security spending, the impact of adverse
cyber events, and opportunity foregone if the technology is underutilized.
We extended International Futures (IFs), an existing multi-issue, multi-country, long-term forecasting system
with formulations driving ICT/cyber advance and impact. In Base Case analysis we found that, while annual
costs related to cyber-attacks and cyber-security spending do come to outweigh the annual incremental econom-
ic beneﬁts from ICT use in high-income countries, over time the compounding nature of the beneﬁts versus the
more additive nature of the costs means that the cumulative beneﬁtswill outstrip the cumulative costs by tens of
trillions of dollars over even medium-term forecast horizons. For lower-income and middle-income countries
both annual and cumulative analyses suggest that beneﬁts will continue to outweigh costs. On a global basis
the cumulative net beneﬁts could exceed $100 trillion through 2030. Four scenarios with signiﬁcantly different
assumptions about technological development and the unfolding of adverse events changed the total values of
beneﬁts and risk-related costs, but not the overall conclusion.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Keywords:
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The media shower us with two competing narratives regarding in-
formation and communications technologies (ICT). They tout the bene-
ﬁts of the latest and greatest technological developments and speculate
often breathlessly about howmuch greater those beneﬁts will be in the
future, even while maintaining a steady drumbeat of dire warnings
concerning the threats that cyber-activism (hacktivism), cybercrime,
cyber-espionage, and even cyberwar and cyber-terrorism pose to econ-
omies and governments around the world. The more analytical litera-
ture on the economic beneﬁts and costs of ICT technologies reinforces
this clash of narratives, with some analysts seeing ICT continuing ton communications technologies.
ter for International Futures,
tes.
. This is an open access article under
ICT/Cyber beneﬁts and costs: R
//dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techforspur signiﬁcant economic growth for decades to come, while others
argue that the beneﬁts have largely been reaped and that the cost of
maintaining adequate cybersecurity and the damage from cyber-
attacks is becoming so great that the technologies will become a liability
and a net drag on growth. But which is it?What is the balance between
the beneﬁts and costs of ICT, and howmight that balance vary over time
and across countries?With ICT technologies becoming ever-more ubiq-
uitous, it is important that we reconcile these two seemingly opposed
narratives.
In this paper, we explore the economic beneﬁts and costs of ICT tech-
nologies and investigate how the balance between themmay change out
to 2030 for 186 developed and developing countries around theworld. In
doing so, we have: (1) constructed typologies of beneﬁts and costs of ICT
and identiﬁed theprimarydriversof change ineachelement; (2)gathered
a wide-range of data on ICT use and pervasiveness; (3) drawn insights
from many individual studies of those elements and (4) augmented the
International Futures (IFs) model—a dynamic, highly-integrated system
for forecasting long-term human development futures across manythe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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siveness, beneﬁts, risks, and costs.2 We present our ﬁndings in terms of
four alternative scenarios built from some of the key uncertainties sur-
rounding the technologies.3 Note that we use information and communi-
cations technology (ICT) and cyber interchangeably in this study.
Our typology, built upon recent literature, breaks both economic
beneﬁts and costs of the technologies into three major categories4:
• Economic beneﬁts of ICT:
o Direct contributions to growth from increases in the size of the ICT-
producing sector
o Indirect contributions to growth from enhanced production and pro-
ductivity across the wider economy thanks to the progressive em-
bedding of ICT into the economy's capital stock
o Consumer-captured surpluses thanks to steadily and rapidly de-
creasing prices or improved capacity and quality offered at the
same price as old systems
• Economic costs of ICT (borneby households,ﬁrms and other organiza-
tions, and governments):
o The spending required to defend against adverse cyber events
(cybersecurity)
o The cost of adverse cyber events—broken down by actor-threat and
target
o Opportunity costs—potential economic beneﬁts that remain unreal-
ized by forgoing the use of ICT out of fear of cyber-attacks or for
other reasons such as social control
ICT's greatest economic beneﬁt has been its contribution to produc-
tivity in the economy at large. Estimates of its past contribution range
from 20 to 30% of annual economic growth, or depending on the coun-
try about 0.6 to 1.5 percentage points of absolute contribution. Many
studies, however, focus more narrowly on the economic impact of indi-
vidual technologies, like broadband, rather than ICT as a whole
(Atkinson and Stewart, 2013; Czernich et al., 2011). Broadband, of
course, is only a recent entry in a series of technologywaves. Today's lat-
est wave, cloud services, build on a foundation of broadband networks,
while, already, several other future waves are visible, including the in-
ternet of everything and artiﬁcial intelligence (see MGI, 2013). Such
waves complicate the analysis and forecasting of ICT's economic im-
pacts, leading some analysts to point to saturation (Gordon, 2012,
2014; Cowen, 2011; Theil, 2011) with respect to annual economic im-
pacts and others to anticipate an acceleration (MGI, 2013; Oulton,
2012; Kurzweil, 2006).
Our analysis of the costs of ICT reinforces a wider perception held in
both the literature and the media: the annual costs from adverse cyber
events and the cybersecurity spending to combat them has been in-
creasing over time as a share of GDP. Estimates are that direct cyberse-
curity spending by ﬁrms worldwide has grown by roughly 8% per year2 The IFs model is housed at the Pardee Center for International Futures at the Univer-
sity of Denver and is available for research and further development without cost, at
www.pardee.du.edu.
3 This paper is a distillation of work done in a larger project on systemic cyber risks
commissioned by the Zurich Insurance Group and in partnership with the Atlantic
Council's Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security.Wewould like to thank Zurich
for its support. The ﬁnal report released to the public is at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
cyberrisks/. An extended report is at http://pardee.du.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/
Cyber%20Risk%20Pardee%20Extended%20Report..pdf.
4 We recognize there are a host of beneﬁts and costs to ICT/cyber beyond those directly
related to economic growth, from the societal beneﬁts of keeping in touch with friends
and staying up to date with the latest YouTube sensations to costs like the loss of privacy
and cyber-bullying. The largely economic focus of this paper should not signal insensitivity
to the importance of these other beneﬁts and costs.
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(Gartner, Inc., 2014). Governments are also increasingly becoming
more security conscious, with the US government's cybersecurity
spending estimated at $13.3 billion in 2015, up from $8.6 billion in
2012 (Smith, 2011). The economic costs of adverse events are especially
difﬁcult estimate. In 2014, the cost of cybercrime and cyber-espionage,
combined, ranged from an estimated 0.1% or less of GDP in Japan to
1.6% of GDP in Germany (CSIS, 2014).
The above discussion suggests that the two greatest uncertainties
surrounding future ICT beneﬁts and costs are (1) the unfolding of the
technologies themselves, and therefore the potential extent of their im-
pact on growth, and (2) the cost of adverse cyber events, especially
around cyberwar and cyber-terrorism. These will shape the scenario
analysis.
It could be that the beneﬁts of ICT will trend downward as impact
from the current wave of technologies saturates. It could also be that
ICT is so closely linked to human knowledge expansion that ICT could
follow the path of other general-purpose technologies (GPTs) like elec-
tricity. It could even set up a positive feedback loop generating expo-
nential advances, moving us to an impending singularity with respect
to artiﬁcial intelligence (Kurzweil, 2006). Nor does the debate over
trends in adverse event costs help us greatly narrow the range of possi-
ble futures—while one side argues that offense will always have an
advantage, causing costs and cybersecurity spending to soar with in-
creasing ICT pervasiveness (Mandiant, 2013), other analyses like that
of Microsoft's (Burt et al., 2014) aroundmalware suggest that defensive
capabilities are increasingly winning the battle.
This paper thus, while offering an admittedly imprecise understand-
ing of the relative beneﬁts and costs of ICT, attempts to ﬁll in the gaps in
the existing literature by (1) building an exhaustive typology of the dif-
ferent beneﬁts and costs; (b) assessing contemporary and future mon-
etary and economic values of individual and total beneﬁts and costs;
(3) encompassing a wide range of ICT types; and (4) exploring ICT fu-
tures in countries at all levels of development. We ﬁrst delve into the
conceptual, data, and formulation issues underlying our efforts to pro-
duce a quantitative model of ICT beneﬁts and costs. We then turn to
our analysis and forecasting across four scenarios designed to explore
the major uncertainties of ICT futures.
2. Materials and methods: ICT and its beneﬁts and costs
In order to analyze the competing beneﬁt and cost narratives for ICT,
four steps are necessary. First, in this section we must discuss the
pattern(s) of likely advance in ICT. Second, also in this section, we
must systematize the beneﬁt and cost narratives by conceptually and
empirically elaborating our typologies of beneﬁts and costs. Third, in
the next section we must represent both ICT advance and its beneﬁts
and costs in IFs. Finally, we must use the augmented IFs system for
Base Case and scenario analysis.
2.1. The future advance (and impact) of ICT
Brieﬂy stated, the different schools of thought regarding ICT's ad-
vance (and therefore its lasting role in driving productivity and growth)
are: (1) the Pessimist school, which views major gains from ICT as a
thing of the past; (2) the Optimist school, which believes that the
gains are likely to continue, and even grow signiﬁcantly, as new tech-
nologies arrive; and (3) a variation or extension of the Optimist school,
that ICT should be regarded as a general-purpose technology (GPT)with
especially wide and long-lasting economic impacts, like the steam en-
gine and electricity before it.
According to the Pessimist school, earlier technologies like electrici-
ty, sanitation, and the automobile already claimed most of the low-
hanging productivity fruit—i.e. they provided lasting productivity
gains that cannot be replicated by existing or future technological inno-
vations (Gordon, 2012, 2014; Cowen, 2011; Theil, 2011). For pessimists,econciling competing perspectives on the current and future balance,
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ﬁnements of earlier technologies and thus are likely to provide only
marginal additional beneﬁts. This diminution of returns is part of their
explanation for why the average annual rate of productivity growth
(in terms of output per hour) in the United States has been markedly
lower over the last 40 years (1.59%) than in the 81 years prior (2.35%)
(Gordon, 2014: 21; see also Gordon, 2012).
At the heart of the Pessimist argument is the notion that the rate of
innovation is slowing down. Byrne et al. (2013: 22) initially found sup-
port for the Pessimist school. They found that ICT's contribution to labor
productivity in the US was signiﬁcantly lower during 2004–2012 (0.64
percentage points) than from 1995–2004 (0.77 percentage points).
But they also pointed out that there tends to be a time-lag in productiv-
ity gains from new technologies—while PCs ﬁrst arrived in the 1980s,
the productivity gains attributed to them only became visible in the
1990s. Thus the gains from the recent transition to post-PC technologies
likemobile broadband equipped smartphones and tabletsmay be yet to
come. The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) (2013), Cardona et al.
(2013), and Starr (2014) similarly found a lag between initial deploy-
ment and economic impact, as it takes time for the technologies to
reach critical mass and for ﬁrms (and society) to reorganize to take
full advantage of them.
The lag between initial deployment andmeasurable productivity ef-
fects obviously support the Optimist school of thought—that we are still
in an early phase of ICT's economic impact. Oulton (2012: 1723) found
that not only did ICT investment in the US reach levels post 2004 that
were signiﬁcantly higher than during the Dot.com boom, but that pro-
ductivity gains remained rapid even during the subsequent bust and re-
cession. A 2013 study by MGI (see also MGI, 2015) examined the
potential economic value by 2025 of 12 “up and coming” disruptive
technologies—those likely to disrupt current economic patterns.5 The
spread of mobile internet technologies, for example, could generate
some $3.7 trillion to $10.8 trillion dollars for the global economy annu-
ally by 2025 (MGI, 2013: 34)—suggesting that by 2025, some 1.9 to 4.2%
of the world's GDP could come from mobile internet technologies.6 For
cloud computing, the estimated economic impact in 2025 could range
from $1.7 to $6.2 trillion dollars. A useful mental model may be of
sub-waves within the long wave of ICT transformation, each of which
leave their mark on economic growth even as they blend into each
other to a signiﬁcant degree.
Building on the Optimist perspective, many researchers have come
to see ICT as bearing the hallmarks of a general-purpose technology
(GPT). GPTs have three primary characteristics: (1) applicability across
a wide range of uses (pervasiveness); (2) a wide scope for improve-
ment, experimentation, and continuously falling prices; (3) facilitating
further innovations in products and processes across sectors (Cardona
et al., 2013; Krestchmer, 2012; OECD, 2013; ITU, 2012; Czernich et al.,
2011; Atkinson and McKay, 2007).72.2. Conceptualizing and measuring beneﬁts
Overall, our analysis of the literature points to three primary avenues
bywhich ICT can drive economic beneﬁt: the growth impacts of the ICT-
producing sector itself, the impact of investment in ICT on the wider
economy via capital services and its enhancing effect on multifactor
productivity and the surplus beneﬁts to consumers not generally cap-
tured in GDP.5 Note: each technology's value is given in terms of its total economic value, including
contribution to GDP and consumer surplus and the report states that the reported values
should not be comparedwith GDP. It does, however, provide a breakdown for a few of the
technologies.
6 Percentages are calculated by taking MGI's estimated potential economic impact,
subtracting their estimated consumer surplus and dividing that by the IFs global GDP fore-
cast for 2025 ($141 trillion).
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According to Atkinson and Stewart (2013: 3), global output from the
ICT-producing sector accounted for 6% of theworld's GDP in 2010,more
than double the percentage in 1995. Based on data from the OECD, the
size of the ICT sector in developed countries, when measured as a
share of the total business sector's value added, followed an inverted
U-shaped pattern between 1995 and 2011.7 The average OECD country
saw its ICT share increase from6.6% in 1995 to a high of 9.5% in 2003 be-
fore undergoing a slow decline to 5.9% in 2011,8 in part because of
growth of the sector in developing countries.
It is interesting to note that the energy sector, globally, is about 5–6%
of GDP and quite stable, about the current size of the ICT sector. As with
energy, it appears likely that some countries will experience a rise in the
relative size of their ICT sectors and others will have largely offsetting
decreases. Therefore, in our economic analysis, we will give limited at-
tention to this aspect of ICT's economic contribution.
2.2.2. Indirect growth beneﬁts: ICT capital services and productivity
Economic production is often explained as a function of capital,
labor, and multifactor (or total factor) productivity (MFP or TFP). Each
of these factors is a stock that accumulates (or depreciates/declines)
over time, whichwe, and other analysts, use to calculate annual produc-
tion (a ﬂow) using a Cobb-Douglas or similar production function.
The Conference Board (CB) used a standard growth accounting
framework to calculate the contribution of a country's ICT capital ser-
vices (from IT hardware, software, and telecommunications equip-
ment) to GDP growth over the period from 1990 to 2013 for 122
developing and developed countries (Conference Board undated,
2014a, and 2014b). The CB (see Fig. 1) found that, at the global level,
ICT capital contributed between 0.5 and 0.7 percentage points to GDP
growth from 1997 to 2013, with developed economies seeing a smaller
contribution (0.3–0.6%) than developing countries (0.7–1.9%).
Youseﬁ's (2011) survey of existing studies on the impact of ICT in-
vestment on growth, focusing on the period 1990–2000, also found a
positive time trend in ICT's impact. Taken together, the 17 studies sur-
veyed found ICT investment contributed 0.49 percentage points to
GDP growth between 1990 and 1995 and 0.72 percentage points be-
tween 1995 and 2000.9
2.2.3. Consumer surplus
A major part of the Optimist argument concerning ICT's economic
impacts is that standard economic measures like GDP do not capture
all the welfare or network effects of their use. Consider trying to mea-
sure the economic impact of internet-based technologies, where free
services like email, search engines, and social networks obviously im-
pact theways peoplework and live but donot necessarily result inmon-
etary transactions recorded in national accounts. MGI (2013: 11)
estimated that “as much as two-thirds of the value created by new In-
ternet offerings tend to be captured as consumer surplus.”
The ICT consumer surplus represents the net monetary value of
consumer-derived beneﬁts from consuming an ICT product or service
after taking into account: (1) willingness to pay for the service;
(2) the actual cost of the services; and (3) any pollution effects arising
from the use of the service (i.e. the negative effects of advertising inter-
ruptions, loss of privacy, data theft, etc.) (MGI, 2011: 54; OECD, 2013;
Dutz et al., 2009; Katz and Koutroumpis, 2013).Total business sector value added refers to the value added by all non-agriculture (incl.
hunting and ﬁshing), real estate, and community (non-market activities like public ad-
ministration, education, and health services) activities (OECD STANdatabase for Industrial
Analysis, available at: www.oecd.org/sti/stan)
8 Data from the OECD Factbook database. Years with data include: 1995, 2003, 2006,
2008, 2009, 2011. Available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/data/oecd-
factbook-statistics/oecd- factbook_data-00590-en [accessed on 5/11/15]
9 See the larger background report for this study (Hughes et al., 2015) for a table of
country-speciﬁc and time-speciﬁc values, as well as more general elaboration of informa-
tion supporting this study.
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Fig. 1. ICT capital services' contribution to GDP growth by World Bank country income group, 1990–2012. Note: Simple cross-country averages of raw data used for each income grouping.
Source: Created from Conference Board Total Economy Database, Contribution of ICT Capital Services to GDP Growth, 2014.
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lating the annual consumer surplus frombroadband is perhaps themost
widely cited and adopted method of calculating consumer surplus—the
OECD (2013) adopted their approach for its own study of the impact of
the internet, the best data source we found on consumer surplus.
Greenstein and McDevitt found that consumers in 30 OECD countries
enjoyed a surplus of $46 billion in 2010, or about 0.09% of their total
GDP in that year (the equivalent of 3% of GDP growth), up from $22 bil-
lion (0.05% of GDP growth) in 2006.10
The authors also provided a “quality-adjusted”measure of consumer
surplus, in order to account for improvements in service quality and
network effects from increasing penetration. This approach tends to
yield a much higher surplus than the standard approach, $437 billion
for the 30 OECD countries in 2010, or about 0.89% of GDP—the
equivalent of 28.9% of GDP growth from 2009–2010 Greenstein and
McDevitt (2012: 15).
2.3. Conceptualizing and measuring costs
Avoidance of and reaction to adverse cyber events are central to the
costs of ICT, but there is no standard typology of such costs. Avoidance
primarily involves cyber security spending by individuals/households,
organizations (including ﬁrms), and governments. We similarly group
the costs associated with adverse cyber events across the same three
actor and target categories. In addition, we consider the opportunity
costs of foregoing use of cyber services or infrastructure due to the
threat of attacks or for other reasons.
2.3.1. Cybersecurity and risk mitigation spending
Estimates of cybersecurity spending are scarce, piecemeal, and not
conﬁdence-inspiring. But taken together, a decent picture emerges.
Based on estimates by the Telecommunications Industry Association
(TIA) and Gartner Inc., cybersecurity spending in the United States in10 These percentages were calculated using the GDP MER historical series in IFs version
7.15.
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around $71 or 0.08% of GDP.11 While the dollar amounts and percent-
ages may vary by source, all seem to agree that spending on security is
set to rise over the coming years as companies become more aware of
the cyber threats they face. TIA, for example, forecasts US spending to
reach $63.5 billion or 0.35% of GDP within three years, while Gartner
Inc. forecasts global spending to grow by 8.2% between 2014 and
2015, to 76.9 billion dollars or 0.1% of GDP with spending on data loss
prevention growing the fastest.
This increase in spending is largely due to the fact that costs of pre-
ventative spending increase exponentially (diminishing returns) with
the pursuit of higher security levels. A survey of 172 technology man-
agers in the US found that companies would need to increase their cy-
bersecurity spending nine-fold in order to stave off 95% of cyber-
attacks—considered to be the highest attainable level of protection
(Engleman and Strohm, 2012). To illustrate the cost to attain a 95% pro-
tection level, we can apply Ponemon's multipliers (reported in
Engleman and Strohm, 2012) for closing security gaps to TIA's current
total US spending ﬁgures, producing a cost estimate of around $414 bil-
lion or roughly 2.5% of total GDP.
The degree to which national and global cybersecurity spending es-
timates include government spending as well as that of industry is not
always clear—though government spending is almost certainly less
than the private sector's. Nonetheless, governments of many developed
countries have established signiﬁcant cyber defense programs and
agencies with substantial funding streams. In the US, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) “spent $459million on its various cyberse-
curity programs in 2012. The Pentagon spent roughly eight times as
much, not even including the defensive and offensive cyber spending
share of NSA's classiﬁed budget” (Singer and Friedman, 2014: 200).
These ﬁgures are in line with market forecasts by Input Inc., which ex-
pects federal spending on cybersecurity to grow from $8.6 billion in“Gartner Says Worldwide Information Security Spending Will Growth Almost 8 Per-
cent in 2014 as Organizations Become More Threat-Aware,” Gartner.com, August 22,
2014. Available at: http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2828722 [accessed on 5/6/
15] and “TIA's 2014–2017 Market Review & Forecast,” Tiaonline.org, 2014. Available at:
http://tiaonline.org/resources/market-forecast [accessed on 5/6/15].
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Strategic Defense Intelligence (SDI) forecasts the global military IT,
data, and computing market will reach $68.6 billion by 2022 (nearly
0.07% of GDP in our calculation).132.3.2. Adverse cyber event costs
Coupledwith ever-increasing reliance on ICT comes the potential for
hacktivists, ﬁrms, criminals, terrorists, and governments to disrupt net-
works, steal data and identities, cause physical damage and loss of life,
and in general exploit vulnerabilities in ICT to their own ends. The liter-
ature is rife with speculation about the potential for sensational cyber-
attacks or cyber wars to disrupt entire industries or crash national
networks.
The cyber threat landscape is characterized by two key dimensions:
actors/targets and motivations/actions (Rid, 2013; Cavelty, 2012; and
Lachow, 2009). There is no single agreed upon actor/threat taxonomy
within the ﬁeld of cybersecurity. We have adopted the widely cited
classiﬁcation of former Special Advisor on Cybersecurity to the
White House, Richard Clarke: (1) hacktivists—individuals or groups
whose motivation for carrying out cyber-attacks is ideological;
(2) cyber criminals—individuals or groups that launch attacks aimed
at ﬁnancial gain; (3) cyber-espionage—attacks with the primary motive
of acquiring intellectual property from ﬁrms or governments; and
(4) cyberwar—destructive attacks launched frompolitically ormilitarily
motived state or non-state actors (Clarke andKnake2010; Clarke 2009).
In our forecasting efforts, we focus not on individual events but on the
country-year pattern of events.
We want to be able to associate likelihood and economic costs with
each type of actor/threat and each target (individuals, organizations,
and governments). Specifying the appropriate probabilities and costs
requires estimates of annual country-wide costs that are difﬁcult to
ﬁnd and vary so signiﬁcantly that any ﬁgure must be taken with great
caution. For example, estimates of the cost of cyber-espionage to the
US range from $2 billion to $500 billion, with the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) suggesting that the US cost of espio-
nage and cybercrime combined is around $113 billion (CSIS, 2014; see
also CSIS, 2013).
CSIS (with McAfee) published estimates of the combined cost of
cybercrime and cyber-espionage as a percent of GDP for 28 countries
which suggest that Germany, the Netherlands, the US, China, and
Singapore are the ﬁve countries most negatively impacted by such at-
tacks (see Fig. 2). The study found that G20 countries bear the predom-
inant burden of costs associated with cybercrime and cyber-espionage,
with damages of over $200 billion in the four largest economies alone.
Lower-income countries, while less of a target now, are expected to
face growing threats as their ICT usage increases.
What are the probabilities of adverse cyber events? IBM and
Ponemon provide estimates derived from surveys regarding the likeli-
hood that a company will experience a data breach in a given period
of time. IBM (2013: 5) reported an estimated 69% likelihood that a com-
pany will experience one or more minor disruptions over a 24-month
period, with a 23% change of a substantial disruption. Similarly,
Ponemon (2014: 18) estimated that over a 24-month period there is a
22% likelihood that a company will experience a data breach involving
at least 10,000 stolen records and a 1% chance of a breach with
100,000 or more records. In terms of cyber-espionage attacks, Verizon
(2014: 39) estimated that the US is targeted in over half of the attacks
worldwide. Furthermore, it indicated that cyber-espionage has been in-
creasing in relative prevalence since 2009 (Verizon, 2014: 9).12 Gerry Smith, “Former Government Ofﬁcials Stand to Proﬁt from Cybersecurity Boom,”
Hufﬁngtonpost.com, September 14th 2011. Available at: http://www.hufﬁngtonpost.com/
2011/09/15/former-government-ofﬁcials-cybersecurity-.
13 “The Global Military IT, Data and Computing Market 2012—2022,” ASDReports.com
November 8th 2012. Available at: https://www.asdreports.com/news-903/global-
military-it-data-computing- market-20122022 [accessed on 5/6/15].
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Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techforThe studies suggest that no country is immune and that the proba-
bility of experiencing amalicious cyber event in a given year, particular-
ly those categorized as criminal or espionage, is not statistically different
from one. The contested possibility of cyberwarfare is one exception to
this observation.We therefore assign a probability of 1 for all cells in the
activity-probability-cost schema except those in the cyber conﬂict/war
row where they will be very nearly 0 for most country-years. The
other cell for which the probabilitywill be very near 0 is that of criminal
attacks on governments. Thus the central variable in exploring the risk
associated with an adverse cyber event becomes the total country-
year costs of each event cell.
The values used in our cyber risk matrix are (to the best of our abil-
ity) calibrated to estimates found in the literature discussed above. A
primary calibration point comes from CSIS (2014), which indicates the
overall cost of cybercrime and cyber-espionage in the US to be 0.64%
of GDP. But when estimates could not be found, or when there were
conﬂicting values, estimation was still necessary. For example, with no
estimates for the cost of US involvement in a cyberwar, we have as-
sumed 1.0% of GDP (roughly twice the 2014 cost of the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan). Because of the great leaps made in such estimation,
the scenario analysis undertaken with IFs becomes especially
important.
The product of our probabilities and costs gives us the overall cost of
adverse cyber events as a percent of GDP. Our ﬁrst rough-cut estimates
indicate that organizations (primarily ﬁrms) bear the lion's share of risk
associated with malicious cyber-attacks, followed by individuals, and
then governments. Were there, of course, any intergovernmental
cyber conﬂict, that ordering could quickly change. Our calculations sug-
gest that, for a country like the United States, total annual costs from ad-
verse cyber events are about 0.63% of GDP.
2.3.3. Opportunity costs
Opportunity costs are costs borne by countries, organizations, and
households alike in the form of risk-adverse behavior that limits the
beneﬁts they might have otherwise received. Opportunity costs gener-
ally originate from one of two sources: (1) a conscious decision not to
use ICT services and infrastructure (so as to avoid risks or to control pop-
ulations), and (2) the underdevelopment of ICT infrastructure for other
reasons including cultural orientation or weak actor capacity. We make
no effort to model different sources of opportunity costs but rather to
estimate total magnitude of them.
To illustrate ICT opportunity costs, Fig. 3 shows the strong relation-
ship between ICT development andGDPper capita. Relative to countries
like South Korea that have higher levels of ICT development than ex-
pected given their level of per capita income (and therefore no opportu-
nity costs), countries like Cuba likely face large opportunity costs by not
investing in ICT and the economic beneﬁts they could provide. In Cuba's
case, their level of ICT development is only about 1/2 of what we would
expect given its GDP per capita. This shortfall could easily be costing the
country something close to 1% of growth in its GDP.
2.4. Comparing the Beneﬁts and Costs of ICT/Cyber
Comparison of the aggregate beneﬁts with the aggregate costs
across the three elements in each typology should provide us with an-
nualized snapshots of the state of cyber risk economics. However,
such snapshots do not tell thewhole beneﬁts versus costs story. It is im-
portant to also consider the cumulative costs and beneﬁts that accrue to
a country over time.
The distinction between annual and cumulative costs and beneﬁts is
important because the economic beneﬁts are heavily manifested from
ICT's rising share of productive capital stocks and consumer beneﬁts,
meaning that they accumulate and compound over time. Barring a
large-scale, sustained threat, the costs directly or indirectly associated
with adverse events do not tend to decrease this stock. Therefore,
even in a hypothetical future in which the annualized costs eventuallyeconciling competing perspectives on the current and future balance,
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Fig. 2. The cost of cybercrime and cyber-espionage expressed as a percent of GDP.
Source: Figure created from data in CSIS (2014: 21).
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the cumulative beneﬁts accrued over the same period may still heavily
outweigh the cumulative costs. This insight weighs against the notion
of an imminent “cybergeddon” — a future world where the costs of
ICT are so high that the technologies become almost unusable.3. Calculations: Representing ICT/cyber in the International Futures
system
Although the literature and available data do not provide an inte-
grated foundation for forecasting ICT beneﬁts and costs, our compila-
tion of sources has provided enough information to develop basic0
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Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techforformulations and then to create a set of scenarios around key elements
of uncertainty.3.1. The IFs system as model foundation
The International Futures (IFs) forecasting system is housed at the
Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures at the University
of Denver's Josef Korbel School of International Studies but is freely
available for use and further development by others (www.pardee.du.
edu). IFs includes detailed models of demographic, economic, sociopo-
litical, education, health, infrastructure, energy production, agricultural,
and governance subsystems for 186 countries interacting in the global0 100 120 140 160
P (thousands of dollars)
ta at PPP and ICT Development Index.
d Bank's World Development Indicators.
econciling competing perspectives on the current and future balance,
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ages connect separate models of the IFs system, providing the ability
to analyze the issue area interactions identiﬁed in this paper. Most of
these models are comparable to standalone models in the issue areas
represented, though some like that for health, are unique to the IFs sys-
tem. The models within IFs of special interest for this paper include the
demographic, economic and infrastructure systems.14
IFs represents population using a standard cohort-component
structure initialized with the most recent data revision from the United
Nations Population Division. Fertility rates and mortality patterns
endogenously respond to other model variables including income and
educational levels. Migration rates come from exogenous forecasts
provided by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(Samir and Lutz, in press).15
The economic model, which draws most heavily on data from the
Global Trade and Analysis Project and the World Development Indica-
tors, represents the economy in six sectors: agriculture, materials, ener-
gy, manufacturing, services, and information and communications
technologies. It is a general equilibrium-seeking model using invento-
ries to provide price signals that chase equilibrium over time. A Cobb-
Douglas production function (following insights of Solow [1956 and
1957] and Romer [1990]) endogenously represents contributions to
growth in multifactor productivity from human capital (education and
health), social capital and governance (domestic security, low corrup-
tion, democracy), physical and natural capital (infrastructure and ener-
gy prices), and knowledge development and diffusion (research and
development and economic integration with the outside world). A Lin-
ear Expenditure System represents changing household consumption
patterns. A social accounting matrix assures balances in intersectoral
and all other ﬂows.
The infrastructure model represents many ICT variables such as
mobile phone and PC ownership rates and both ﬁxed and mobile
broadband prevalence. Additionally, it includes variables for road
transportation, water and sanitation, and electricity. See Rothman
et al. (2014) for detailed treatment.3.2. Forecasting ICT/Cyber beneﬁts and costs
Fig. 4 provides a high level schematic diagram of the risks or costs
and beneﬁts of ICT as structured in IFs. There are twomaindeterminants
of the various beneﬁts and costs. The ﬁrst driver is the pervasiveness of
ICT within countries in any year at any point in time. The second is the
extent of cybersecurity and the probabilities and costs of adverse
cyber events. Both of these determinants are, in turn, affected by certain
assumptions represented by the ﬁrst box in Fig. 4 (upper left), which
represents the exogenous rate of technological change and social and
political decisions that might affect ICT diffusion and security (such as
greater or lesser restrictions on ICT deployment and use). This section
ﬁrst discusses the representation of ICT/cyber pervasiveness and the
nexus of variables around cybersecurity spending and adverse event
probability and cost, and then moves to discussion of other ICT/cyber
beneﬁt and cost variables.163.2.1. ICT/cyber pervasiveness
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) collects and pro-
vides a large number of data series. Among these, the ITU built the ICT
Development Index (IDI) to track ICT development across 166 countries
as a composite of three sub-indices: (1) Access to ICT infrastructure and
services; (2) Use of ICT; and (3) Skills for ICT uptake. We have created a
close variant of the IDI in IFs (ICTINDEX) because the model already14 Documentation on each model is available at http://www.pardee.du.edu/node/484.
15 Detailed migration data provided by personal communication from Samir KC.
16 Hughes et al. (2015) providemore detailed explanation with full model and equation
documentation.
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the sub-indices.17
One weakness of the IDI is that it is closely tied to current ICT/cyber
technology, particularly mobile phones and broadband use, which are
likely to saturate over timewhile other ICT/cyber technologies continue
to advance. Thus, the IDI may underestimate future prevalence. We
added a multiplier to our version of the IDI for use in scenario analysis
to postpone this saturation.
3.2.2. Cybersecurity spending and security levels
Cybersecurity spending as a percentage of GDP (ICTCYBSPEND)
serves two purposes. First, it is one of the key costs of cyber risk. Second,
it should, ceteris paribus, increase cybersecurity. The relatively scarce
data suggest that spending has been rising over time, both absolutely
and as a percentage of GDP. We have put into IFs a formulation,
which, supported by the literature, drives spending as a portion of
GDP by (1) GDP per capita level and (2) the ICT pervasiveness index.
We also added a multiplier allowing strong scenario control over it, to
reﬂect social choices and policies. We formulated our cybersecurity
spending to saturate over time at around 0.4% of GDP.
We further created a cybersecurity index (ICTCYBSECUR) based on
the ITU's Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI). The GCI ranks the cyber
security capabilities of 195 countries across ﬁve categories: (1) legal
measures; (2) technical measures; (3) organizational measures; (4) ca-
pacity building for awareness and access to resources; and (5) the level
of intrastate and international cooperation. Unlike our representation of
the IDI, we cannot forecast the cybersecurity index from other variables
in IFs. We instead forecast it from driving variables, namely the ICT
development Index and cybersecurity spending. The formulation is
tied most fundamentally to the magnitude of the ICT development
index as indicated in Fig. 5. It may surprise some that cybersecurity
riseswith ICT/cyber pervasiveness rather than falling, but this is entirely
consistent with the ﬁndings of a Microsoft study (Burt et al., 2014) that
showed malware control costs rising with development generally.
3.2.3. Adverse event probabilities and costs
The second cost associated with cyber risk is that of adverse events
(ICTCYBEVCOST), also represented in IFs as a percentage of GDP. IFs
computes the basic core of adverse event cost as a function of two
elements speciﬁed via user-modiﬁable parameters: (1) the probability
of adverse events by actor category (hacktivism, cybercrime, cyber-
espionage, and cyber-terrorism) and target (households, ﬁrms/organi-
zations, and governments); and (2) the cost of such adverse events.
Around that parametric core, total cyber costs increase with ICT/cyber
pervasiveness and decrease with cybersecurity. Again, the user can
change the trajectory of event costs through scenario creation. Because
the data are relatively strong, we began with the values and probabili-
ties pieced together for the United States and scaled other country-
years relative to those.
3.2.4. ICT/cyber contributions to economic growth (productivity) and
possible opportunity costs
The third cost associated with ICT, namely opportunity costs
(ICTCYBOPCOST) is only meaningfully conceptualized in relationship
to the productivity beneﬁt available from ICT (ICTCYBBENFIT) and the
portion of that forgone by not fully embracing ICT. Earlier discussion
showed how difﬁcult and uncertain analyzing ICT's impact on produc-
tivity and GDP growth can be. The numbers produced by that analysis
would, however, be consistent with a crude estimate that approximate-
ly ¼ of productivity gains could, on average across countries, come from
ICT. We would expect somewhat more absolute growth contribution in
countries with faster MFP growth (e.g. the 5% of China or 4% of India)
than those with slower growth (e.g. the roughly 1.2% of the US),17 Such indices are, of course,widespread in literatures across all important issue areas of
IFs, from agriculture (Valipour, 2015) to technological change.
econciling competing perspectives on the current and future balance,
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Fig. 4. High-level overview of the forecasting in IFs of cyber risks/costs and beneﬁts.
Source: Authors' conception.
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might be contributing roughly 1.2% to growth in China and roughly
0.3% in the US. This approach is consistent with the observation that
ICT has greater potential contribution to growth in developing than de-
veloped countries. Rather than a ﬁxed 1/4 assumption, however, theC
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MFP is determined by a function developed by trial and error so as to en-
sure that the ICT/cyber growth beneﬁts ﬁt historical data from the Con-
ference Board as well as possible across global income-category
groupings. That function decreases the basic fractional share from 30%hina
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n of the ICT Development Index.
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9B.B. Hughes et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxxto 15%with increasing GDP per capita. Around this basic calculation, the
actual growth contribution is further inﬂuenced by the ICTINDEX,
reﬂecting the pervasiveness of ICT relative to the level expected given
GDP per capita.
Turning to opportunity costs, Fig. 3 earlier provided information
about the level of expected ICT pervasiveness as a function of GDP per
capita at purchasing power parity. The model calculates opportunity
costs only for countries below the line where the magnitude of those
costs is the product of the potential productivity beneﬁt times the
proportional distance below expected ICT pervasiveness levels.
3.2.5. Consumer surplus
Beyond ICT's contribution to productivity and GDP growth, its sec-
ond primary economic beneﬁt is to consumers and is appropriately
called consumer surplus. The Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD, 2013) provided good estimates. The average
annual contribution is approximately 0.2% of GDP, making it somewhat
smaller than the contribution of ICT/cyber toMFP advance. Larger econ-
omies (notably the United States, Japan, Germany, and the United
Kingdom) tend to have lower annual consumer surpluses, not exceed-
ing 0.1% of GDP per capita, probably reﬂecting their early ICT adoption.
We created a forecasting formulation quite similar to that for the
economic growth beneﬁt, using an estimate of consumer surplus contri-
bution as a share of moving average GDP growth based on a function
that results in initial forecasting values comparable to historical data
for OECD countries. That value is then scaled up or down for countries
with more or less ICT pervasiveness.
3.3. ICT/Cyber total and cumulative beneﬁts and costs and forward linkages
Forecasting the net costs or beneﬁts as percentages of GDP allows us
to compute cost and beneﬁt summary variables on a country-year basis.
For accumulation of those over time we use a simple sum of the costs
and a compounding of the beneﬁts.
Although it would be desirable to account for the speciﬁc source of
cost streams (some portion of that could crowd out investment, also
with a compounding effect over time)we do not do so, a known but rel-
atively minor analytical weakness. Similarly, it would be desirable to
link the beneﬁt stream of ICT forward to economic growth, and failure
to do so is another known weakness. We do, however, link forward
the ICT index to the calculation of MFP and, because that is a direct driv-
er of beneﬁts, it greatly ameliorates that omission.
4. Results: Scenarios and forecasts of ICT beneﬁts and costs through
2030
All scenarios build on the IFs Base Case scenario. The Base Case is not
a simple extrapolation of variables inmultiple issue areas, but rather the
dynamic, nonlinear output of the fully integrated IFs system. For exam-
ple, IFs forecasts of key drivers, such as GDP per capita and population
are foundational underpinnings of our Base Case ICT forecasts. Further,
changes in assumptions in ICT pervasiveness, beneﬁts, and or risks
(costs) result in changes in demographics, economics, and all other sys-
tems in IFs. Feedback loops across the many components of the IFs sys-
tem mean that interventions may accelerate (or dampen) the beneﬁts
and costs of ICT and other modeled aspects of human development.
4.1. Deﬁning a scenario space
Earlier discussion drew out two primary dimensions of uncertainty
that frame the level of and balance between the beneﬁts and costs asso-
ciated with ICT. The ﬁrst involves the unfolding of the technologies
themselves, speciﬁcally the rates of potential continued development
and pervasiveness. This unfolding has particular implications for bene-
ﬁts, because development and deployment of ICT contributes to eco-
nomic productivity and consumer surplus. The second key dimensionPlease cite this article as: Hughes, B.B., et al., ICT/Cyber beneﬁts and costs: R
Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techforof uncertainty involves the future probability and costs of adverse
cyber events. Fig. 6 illustrates the manner in which these two dimen-
sions of uncertainty frame a scenario space and Box 1 lists model
interventions.
In the upper-left-hand quadrant, The Wave Plays Out, the beneﬁts
from the current wave of ICT largely saturate with mobile broadband
access—which some analysts have argued is likely to be the last major
ICT development in terms of its economic impact—allowing signiﬁcant
stabilization of the cyber world and allowing defensive capabilities to
catch up with and overcome offensive capabilities. Yet mobile broad-
band appears much more likely to represent just the latest sub-wave
of ICT with manymore waves to come. Hence, we include this scenario
more out of a sense of completeness rather than a belief that it repre-
sents a likely outcome.
In Electricity-like GPT, the growing criticality of ICT across the global
economy and societies around the world drives continued and rapid
economic growth and underpins new waves of technologies. This cen-
trality incentivizes governments and many social actors (including cor-
porations) to work together to increase defensive capabilities with
redundancies and recovery mechanisms, thereby keeping the costs of
offensive cyber actions under control.
In Insecurity Undercuts Beneﬁts, offensive capabilities gain the upper
hand; increasingly sophisticated attacks from hacktivists, criminals, ter-
rorists, and governments inﬂict severe costs causing many actors to ei-
ther spend more on cybersecurity or curtail their use of the
technologies, reducing beneﬁts and slowing the pace of further techno-
logical development.
In Constant Battle for Security, ICT again increases in criticality, but
governments and other actors—who worked together successfully in
Electricity-Like GPT—are unable to coordinate their actions or even
work at cross-purposes, while independent actors aggressively push
new technologies forward, each providing new beneﬁts but also new
vulnerabilities to adverse cyber events. The result is a back and forth be-
tween offensive and defensive capabilities.
4.2. Base case global summary of beneﬁts and costs
Before looking at variation of ICT beneﬁts and costs across scenarios
and across global income-level groupings, it is useful to see the Base
Case forecasts for the world (Fig. 7). It provides several important foun-
dational insights. First, the annual contributions of ICT to GDP growth
and adverse events are roughly similar in magnitude globally, as are se-
curity spending and consumer surplus, with opportunity costs calculat-
ed to be small. Second, growth contributions and adverse event costs
each have slightly more than twice the magnitude of consumer surplus
and security spending. Third, there is an upward trend in both costs and
beneﬁts.
We shall, of course, see that cumulative beneﬁts and costs have
quite different patterns, but we can show those in the context of the
scenarios.
4.3. Comparing costs and beneﬁts across scenarios and income categories
The picture of annual net beneﬁts varies greatly across country in-
come levels and scenarios. Fig. 8 suggests several insights concerning
the pattern of net annual beneﬁts across the four scenarios (ordered
in quadrants like those that deﬁned the scenarios in Fig. 6). First, already
in 2010, the annual costs outweigh the beneﬁts for high-income coun-
tries, due mainly to saturation effects, and that gap grows over time in
all scenarios. Second, in sharp contrast, all other income groups saw
positive net beneﬁts ranging from 0.5 to just above 2% of GDP in 2010,
with net beneﬁts remain positive through 2030 in all scenarios except
Insecurity Undercuts Beneﬁts (where all income groups see the net ben-
eﬁts of ICT turn negative from−0.5 to−1.5% of GDP). But while annual
net beneﬁts remain positive for developing countries in the other sce-
narios, in The Wave Plays Out and Constant Battle for Security, theyeconciling competing perspectives on the current and future balance,
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of technology advance (Wave) and the increasing cost of adverse
cyber events (Battle). It is only in Electricity-like GPT that the net ben-
eﬁts grow for all developing country income categories through
2030, thanks to new technology waves undoing the saturation effect.
Third, the net beneﬁts of low-income countries remain larger than
those of both lower- and upper-middle income countries throughout
the time horizon and across scenarios as they have themost room for
network growth and therefore are likely to suffer the least, econom-
ically, from adverse events. Fourth, outside of Electricity, developingBox 1
Specifying the interventions (all have an initial year of 2016).
Pessimistic on technological advance
TheWave Plays Out—assumes saturation of ICT Development In-
dex, with no new waves of technology; the costs of hacktivism,
cybercrime and cyber-espionage drop 20% by 2030, reflecting
dominance of defensive capabilities in a technologically stagnat-
ing cyber world; cyberwar and cyber-terrorism costs/probability
remain zero throughout the time horizon.
Insecurity Undercuts Benefits— assumes saturation of ICT Devel-
opment Index, no new waves of technology; the costs of
hacktivism, cybercrime, and cyber-espionage increase by 30%
by 2030 as offensive capabilities win out—even with a 20% in-
crease in cybersecurity spending by 2030; and the probability of
cyberwar increases to 50% by 2030.
Optimistic on technological advance
Electricity-like GPT—new waves of ICT technologies lead the ICT
Development Index to double by 2030; the costs of hacktivism,
cybercrime and cyber-espionage are reduced by 20% by 2030,
reflecting cooperation by primary actors; cyberwar and cyber-ter-
rorism costs/probability remain zero throughout.
Constant Battle for Security— new waves of ICT technologies
lead the ICT Development Index to double by 2030; the costs of
hacktivism, cybercrime, and cyber-espionage increase by 30%
as new disruptive technologies give offensive capabilities the
edge—even with a 20% increase in cybersecurity spending by
2030; and the probability of cyberwar increases to 50% by 2030.
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over time—with upper-middle-income countries unsurprisingly
exhibiting the greatest movement toward the pattern of high-income
countries.
Turning to the analysis of net cumulative beneﬁts or costs over time
(Fig. 9), even with the exceptionally high costs of Insecurity Undercuts
Beneﬁts, the compounding cumulative contributions of ICT to productiv-
ity growth and consumer surpluses create positive cumulative net
returns—if that were not true we would likely see a world in which
nearly all cyber activities were shut down by actors seeking tominimize
long-term losses. Note that the total global cumulative beneﬁt of
Electricity-Like GPT is roughly $35 trillion more than the total net bene-
ﬁts of Insecurity Undercuts Beneﬁts. The broader impact of this is that
annual global GDP at PPP in 2030 is approximately $8 trillion higher in
Electricity-Like GPT. To put this in context, the world GDP in 2030 is
$138 trillion and cumulative GDP from 2010 through 2030 is $2,060
trillion.
Again, of course, there is great variation across global income
levels and regions, as well as across scenarios. Fig. 10 shows the cu-
mulative net beneﬁts across global income groups by scenario.
While in Electricity-Like GPT upper-middle-income countries gain
$68 trillion dollars in cumulative beneﬁt, higher-income countries
gain signiﬁcantly less, at $42 trillion. Lower-middle-income coun-
tries have $25 trillion net beneﬁts and low-income countries, in
spite of their very much greater beneﬁts as a portion of GDP, see
only $3 trillion.
Overall, our scenario analysis shows the great uncertainty of
global futures with respect to the beneﬁts and costs of the unfolding
cyber world. The interaction of the huge uncertainties around the
technologies themselves with the also very great ones surrounding
the behavior of government and non-governmental actors creates
extremely different global and regional futures. If the great wave of
ICT advance continues to unfurl in coming decades, the stakes
around shaping better rather than less good or even bad worlds are
very high. There are, of course, some commonalities across the
scenarios—even if the challenges of offensive actors to defensive
ones grow, and the longer-term economic beneﬁts of ICT for econo-
mies and consumer surpluses saturate, the net cumulative beneﬁts
of ICT to humanity will still be measured in the tens if not hundreds
of trillions of dollars. Thus, even the negative scenarios are remark-
ably positive.econciling competing perspectives on the current and future balance,
e.2016.09.027
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
20
20
20
21
20
22
20
23
20
24
20
25
20
26
20
27
20
28
20
29
20
30
Pe
rc
en
t o
f G
DP
GDP Growth Consumer Surplus Cybersecurity Spending Adverse Event Cost Opportunity Cost
Fig. 7. ICT/cyber annual global beneﬁts and costs, base case, 2010–2030.
Source: IFs version 7.17.
11B.B. Hughes et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxx5. Conclusions
This paper has surveyed much of the existing literature and data on
the beneﬁts and costs of ICT and their variation across time and coun-
tries. We found that, in general, the greatest beneﬁts of ICT come from
its compounding contributions to growth and productivity across all
sectors of the economy, much like earlier general-purpose technologies
like steam and electricity, while the greatest costs are those associated
with successful adverse cyber events.
On a global basis, the annual balance of beneﬁts and costs has been
changing and it appears quite likely that annual costs will come to out-
weigh (new or incremental) annual beneﬁts in the near term, as theyPe
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Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techforalready appear to do in high-income countries. Yet, even in this annual
analysis, net beneﬁts are likely to persist through 2030 for all develop-
ing country income groupings.
But the nature of ICT's contribution to capital stocks andmultifac-
tor productivity means that the beneﬁts of ICT carry over and com-
pound across time; hence, the cumulative compounded sum of
economic beneﬁts is almost certainly to be much larger today, even,
than the cumulative but additive sumof costs—a situation all but certain
to continue.
The value of this paper and the larger project of which it was part
(seeHughes et al., 2015; Healey andHughes, 2015), has been to identify
these conceptual elements, to initialize their valuewith the best dataweUpper-middle-income countries High-income countries
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theoretical understandings and past development, and to enhance our
ability to explore alternative assumptions motivated by potentially
very different scenario stories.
We recognize the inevitable limitations associated with each of
these contributions and that uncertainty exists along several aspects
of this paper, including: (1) the future pattern of technology advance,
including the possibility for technological discontinuities instead of
the successive wave model adopted here; (2) the exact level of ICT's
contribution to productivity and GDP growth; (3) the probability and
impact of severe adverse cyber events like cyberwar.Pe
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Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techforThis paper and the IFsmodel enhancements provide an initial founda-
tion for exploring each of these uncertainties. Additional model reﬁne-
ment (like the linking of consumer surplus back to economic growth)
may reduce some uncertainty, but further reduction will also depend on
the availability of more extensive and detailed data sets. It will also
depend on continued improvements in mapping of the pattern of tech-
nology advance over time and speciﬁcation of the relationship between
ICT and various costs and beneﬁts, especially economic growth, consumer
surplus, and adverse event costs. In all, our hope is that the platform
createdhere can continue to beused and reﬁned so as to better understand
the balance and risk and reward in the cyber world.Upper-middle-income countries High-income countries
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